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Memorandum to Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal, on Subversive Warfare from William J. Donovan.

- 1. To protect our prestige abroad and our unity at home from attacks by the Soviet Union, open recognition (in such form as would best enable the American people to understand) should be given of the existence of subversive warfare against us by the employment of psychological, economic and political measures.
- 2. In order properly to estimate the entire situation it would be necessary to analyze the subversive operations of the Soviet Union in those countries where it and the United States face each other in Europe and Asia and to consider those means which we could best employ to counter the moves of the Soviet Union and to initiate psychological, economic and political attacks against it.
- 3. Our purpose should be to take the initiative in asserting our world leadership by supporting those political forces that are resisting subjugation and by continuing our support of resistant groups within the countries already taken over by the Communists.
- 4. Assuming that the most immediate requirements lie in the West, we should realize that (1) it will be necessary to deal with the problems of Eastern Europe by clandestine means and that (2) with Western Europe it would be possible and desirable to develop a program to be carried out openly, aggressively and with the clear assertion that all who are not with us are against us.

		5. 7	Го	develop the	clandestine	means	for	Eastern	Europe	there	are
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for	Western	Europe	there	are	Americ	ans w	ith w	vorking	cor	ntacts	espe	cially
in			who w	vould	i be of	great	t val	Lue.				

7. The Scandinavian countries are in a different category. It would seem a wise and effective move to send as our Minister to Sweden a man who is engaged in labor activities at home and is symmathetic to those

- man who is engaged in labor activities at home and is sympathetic to those labor movements abroad in the fight against Communists. I believe word of such an appointment would run like wild fire throughout all of Europe, as it would give an answer to the Communist charge against us of "reactionary."
- 8. Labor is the striking head in Europe in its fight against Communistic countrol of the labor unions. The weapons needed for this kind of warfare are gasoline printing presses news print and most of all a news service which would furnish information on the psychologic and political front. Consideration must be given to the best method of handling these facilities.
- 9. Under the Second Decontrol Act of 1947 broad powers are vested in the Secretary of Commerce to exercise export controls. If the Marshall Plan is to be successful, it must be buttressed by measures which will insure that the population of Europe know where and how and why America is doing it. Also export controls must play a significant part in the fulfillment of the plan and preferential treatment for cooperating nations implies something less than preferential treatment for other nations.

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10. In the last analysis, the use of the export control machinery to deny American goods to unfriendly countries must be dependent upon our political policy in regard to those countries.

- 11. The United States is the largest supplier of materials which are in great scarcity and if it were, for example, to embargo the shipment of steel mill products to Russia (especially the shipment of heavy material items such as metal binding machinery, electrical machinery and apparatus) the result would affect the reconstruction of the Soviet Union.
- 12. Any economic sanction should include a control over the activities of technical personnel from Russia to the United States and also a limitation in the number of Russians who enter this country on official missions to the number of Americans who are allowed to visit Russia.
- effort to cut down on the Soviet penetration of American organizations.

 Our people do not seem to appreciate that there is a pattern of activity of the Communist which is an essential part of the Soviet Union strategy and tied into its other operations. The Russians have made the United Nations a base for its propaganda and an operational center for its subversive movements here under leaders with diplomatic immunity.
- lu. Radio has a vital function in the use of propaganda. The purchase of time in and the installation of a radio station in Western Europe could be of great practical value. While American broadcasts could supplement those of the countries concerned, the accent must be made by those countries who are fighting with us.
- 15. I quote a paragraph from Tito's speech as reported in The New York Times on September 29th as an official announcement of what we must meet:

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"Insufficient courage and determination had been shown by Communists in some countries. An armed struggle is needed when public demonstrations are impossible . . . The Communist leaders lack confidence on the people's fronts, have not been militant."

8 March 1948

Major General William J. Domovan 2 Wall Street New York 5, New York

Dear General Donovan:

TAT

In compliance with your request to my representative, I am pleased to forward a list of the decorations awarded to the Office of Strategic Services' personnel and foreign nationals associated with that organization, as compiled from the OSS files.

It is probable that this list is not complete since copies of all orders effecting the awards undoubtedly did not reach the Citations Office for recording. However, it contains all of the awards for which official notification was received.

Sincerely,

R. H. HILLSAMMETTER.

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Tile: Donovan Wm. Q

27 May 1947

From:

Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter

* URGENT

To:

General W. J. Donovan Two Wall Street

New York City

Classification

WILL CALL AT YOUR OFFICE NOON

THANKS IMMENSELY

Distribution:

Copy - Director 1 cc Exec. Reg.

2 cc Central Records

NEW YORK 5

Washington Office Earle Building Washington 4, D. C.

May 26th, 1947

Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, Central Intelligence Group, 2430 E Street, N. W. Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Admiral Hillenkoetter:

Thank you very much for your letter of 21 May 1947.

If you think I can be of any help I should be very pleased to talk with you.

Would it be convenient for you to come to New York on Thursday of this week? You could be at my office at noon and then at one o'clock I could have meet with us three or four men experienced in intelligence.

I would be very glad to put you up if you plan to stay over, and also Mrs. Hillenkoetter.

Hoping that this suggestion is satisfactory, I look forward to seeing you.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan

Executive Registry
Central Records (2)

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21 May 1947

Major General William J. Donovan Donovan, Leisure, Newton, Lumbard & Irvine Two Wall Street New York 5, N. Y.

Dear General:

As you probably are aware, I was recently called back from Paris and assigned as Director of the Central Intelligence Group. This assignment was definitely unsought, and, although the job is exceptionally interesting, we hated to leave Paris to go through the hurly-burly of Washington.

You being the past master in this art, I am presuming to ask if you will give me some advice as well as your ideas on the subject. If you will consent to my taking up some of your time this way, I shall be glad to see you when you may be in Washington, either in the office or elsewhere, or if it will be more convenient for you, I shall be glad to come up to New York.

With very kindest regards, believe me,

Most sincerely.

A/R. N. N. R. H. HILLENKOETTER Rear Admiral, USN Director of Central Intelligence

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Note for record: This letter written at the suggestion of Senator Saltonstall.

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16 July 1946

Major General William J. Donovan Donovan Leisure Newton Lumbard & Irvine Two Wall Street New York 5, N. Y.

Dear General Donovan:

	Thank you	very much for your courtesy in forward-
ing the 1	letter from	
		AG OT AGRE. THESLORE WHEN WITH TH MITH
matter.		has been asked to contact us.

STAT

I am wondering if you ever get down to Washington these days. I realize you are very busy, but I would appreciate a few minutes of your time at your convenience. No one realizes more than I do the implications of the task that has been handed me, and I feel that should you be able to give me a few minutes it would give me a boost in the right direction. Your "know how" in these matters would, I feel, keep me from making many obvious mistakes and assist me in avoiding some of the pitfalls that would be evident to you.

With kindest personal regards.

Very sincerely yours,

HOYT S. VANDENBERG Lieutenant General, USA Director of Central Intelligence Release 2002/07/29 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002500060008-3

Startling Statement of General Donovan

"BETTER WAR TODAY IN GERMANY THAN TOMORROW A THOUSAND MILES AWAY"

The head of the Strategic Service of the United States is in Berlin.

Berlin, 17. -- General William Donovan, ahead of the American Strategic Services during the war, arrived in the ex-capital of Germany today. After participating in the conference which General Clay holds weekly with his staff, General Donovan made the following statement:

"If Russias wants a war, it is better that the fight should begin immediately in Germany rather than later at a thousand miles distance. The withdrawal of the United Stated from Berlin would cause repercussions throughout all Europe in political and economic circles which would be really disasterous for the western cause."

"No international conference," continued the general, "could resolve the situation at this moment. The only actual solution for the United States, England, and France is the application of severe economic and other types of sanctions against the Soviet Union. Such sanctions would be only the consequence of the provocations the Russians have given us." Donovan suggested for example the possibility of forbidding the passage of all Soviet vessels through the Suez, Panama, and Kiel canals and to invite Turkey to adopt measures for the closing of the Dardanelles.

"If the Russians want to transform their pressure on Berlin into an economic war, " he concluded, "we should not limit our reactions to Germany but should extend them to all parts of the world where Russia is weak. We have tried to negotiate and have received a kick in the face. We have sought a policy of expansion and the Soviets have done everything to hamstring it. The American government should extend its field of action to include the whole world."

The startling statements of General Donovan were exhoed yesterday at Wiesbaden by General LeMay, supreme commander of the American Air Forces in Europe. In announcing the arrival in Great Britain today of 60 superforts, he stated that the planes would fly practice combat missions and would make landings in Germany during their practice flights in cooperation with other units already located in the American Zone of Occupation. It is also interesting to note in this connection that there are already 30 other superforts in Germany besides numerous other plans of other types, plus those being used to supply Berlin. There are also 16 planes of the latest model.

The Russians, according to the statement released yesterday, today brought in large formations of planes in the air corridor which is being used to supply the German metropolis. These planes were making landings in various order.

The controlled press of the Soviets reported to the Germans that the United States would not dare to risk a new war by breaking the blockade of Berlin, in view of the fact that Russia and its satellites are so strong. Thus in a bellicose editorial of the Tägliche Rundschau, organ of the Siviet occupation, it was stated that if a war were to break out, the Soviet troops would be in a position to reach the Rhine in a few days and the Atlantic coast in a few weeks.







